The shift from feudalism to industrial capitalism was generally accompanied by an increase in social mobility. We ask whether such an increase has occurred in a developing nation currently undergoing rapid industrialization, Indonesia. It has, at least as measured by a declining intergenerational correlation of education. To highlight the effects of economic growth on intergenerational mobility, we contrast Indonesia's experience with that of Bangladesh, where industrialization has proceeded more slowly and the correlation between parents' and children's education has been roughly stable. We also examine potential causal channels for the rising educational mobility we find in Indonesia, but cannot identify specific pathways related to above-average school building or rapid industrialization in a region.
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I        E     I      C    , class barriers were very hard to penetrate. That is, children of aristocrats remained in the aristocracy and children of poor, malnourished, and poorly educated peasants by and large remained poor, unhealthy, and poorly educated. 1 Even in contemporary Indonesia, the setting for this study, there was a wellestablished caste system on Java that survived from the colonial era through the 1950s and beyond. Some were born aristocratic priyayi , others were born into a middle caste, and most were born and spent their lives as peasants.
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The intergenerational transmission of advantage for aristocrats included even the language that lower-caste people used when speaking to them.
In modern capitalist societies parental status remains important in predicting children's success (Zimmerman 1992; Solon 2002; Mazumder 2005) . Nevertheless, since the development and rise of capitalism in Great Britain, Western Europe, and the United States, the influence of family background on offspring success has waned. 2 Has this tendency also characterized recent economic industrialization and development? Our answer is based on an examination of Indonesia between the 1960s and the mid-1990s, a period in which Indonesia experienced some of the fastest economic growth in history. During this interval, as per capita income quadrupled, the use of caste-specific formal Javanese declined. We analyze the educational opportunities of three generations to determine whether this decline in caste language signals a more comprehensive rise in intergenerational mobility.
To highlight the importance of economic growth and industrialization (as opposed to secular changes over the entire globe) we also present results from Bangladesh-a nation with similar location (South Asia), religion (heavily Muslim), and initial economic structure (largely agricultural), but slower industrialization during the same period.
Understanding changes in the consequence of family background is important for at least two reasons. First, the rigidity of Western-style feudalism and other precapitalist modes of production led to unequal opportunity. If societies in other parts of the modern world were similarly inflexible initially and then increasingly mobile across generations as they industrialized, economic growth can claim another significant success in addition to rising incomes: increasing equality of opportunity. The charge some critics level at orthodox prescriptions for economic development, that such development brings with it increasing inequality, would be partially checked if equality of opportunity rises along with income inequality.
Second, there are several theories (reviewed below) linking economic development and intergenerational mobility, with many suggesting there need not be an equity-efficiency tradeoff and furthermore that causation runs both from growth to mobility and from mobility to growth. Contrasting cases of Nations with tradition-based economies and little industry have low levels of income and education. A set of overlapping theories predicts that such societies will also produce high correlations between children's education and parental advantages.
This outcome is most pronounced in societies with a strong caste system, where both parent and offspring must choose education under an identical set of binding constraints. Indonesia's caste system was never as encompassing as that found in much of India for example. Nevertheless, in portions of the archipelago such as Java and Bali (where the majority of Indonesians live) during precolonial and colonial times children inherited much of their social status and roles. Less elaborate tribal systems, typically exhibiting lower intergenerational correlation of status, prevailed over the remaining parts of the archipelago (Mulder 1996) , but relatively few Indonesians lived in these areas. 4 Economic theories also predict a high intergenerational correlation for several reasons. First, incomes are low on average and by definition very low for the poor. To the extent education is a normal good, its demand will also be very low for the poor (Becker and Tomes 1979) . At the same time, poor families also frequently face liquidity constraints (Becker and Tomes 1986) , if only because they have essentially no assets with which to provide collateral. Liquidity constraints prevent optimal borrowing for high-return investments in offspring education.
advantage on children's education. Industrial development in Indonesia began in earnest in the late 1960s and continued through the end of our study period (2000) ; manufacturing output's contribution to total GDP increased nearly 200 percent during this period. By examining three cohorts across several different provinces in Indonesia, we can test whether intergenerational correlations of advantage have been affected by these changes.
Data
The data used in this analysis come from the 1993, 1997, and 2000 waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) (Frankenberg et al. 1995; Frankenberg and Thomas 2000; Strauss et al. 2004, respectively) . The IFLS has information on individuals in approximately 7224 households distributed in several hundred villages or neighborhoods, making it a representative sample of 83% of the late-1993 population, covering thirteen of twenty-seven provinces in the country. Small and/or politically unstable provinces such as Irian Jaya and the former East Timor were not sampled. After stratifying by urban and rural areas, households were randomly selected in 321 enumeration areas. Within households different members were interviewed according to various selection criteria to ensure adequate numbers of older respondents.
We examine intergenerational mobility in education for three different cohorts. The younger cohort, those born between 1976 and 1980, gives us the most recent generation that had largely completed its education by the time of the second wave of the IFLS. 5 We compare their experiences with the middle cohort, born between 1961 and 1969, and the older cohort, those born between 1943 and 1956. We chose these cohorts to take advantage of the coincidence of the IFLS waves with the typical age at which Indonesians complete school and the typical age at which they move from their parents' households to establish their own as well as to avoid confounding effects from the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The selection of the younger cohort is the least controversial as they were the youngest to have largely completed their schooling before the financial and macroeconomic crisis in [1997] [1998] . With the younger cohort as an anchor, the middle and older cohort were selected to give comparable sample size and to be situated meaningful distances from each other temporally. The three cohorts together are intended to be representative of all the cohorts for which we had data. 6 The selection criteria imply that some individuals who were children in the older cohort appear again as parents of younger-cohort children. Additional discussion of cohort makeup takes place in specific analyses below.
Education is measured as the total number of years of schooling. The education for an individual can be reported by one or more of the respondent, the household head or spouse (when filling out a household roster), or a child reporting on deceased or nonresident parents. While we use selfreports whenever possible, we will use other reports when necessary and available. Implications of this choice and other structural issues in the IFLS education data are discussed in the appendix.
For some analyses we drew on the 1985 and 1995 Intercensal Population Surveys (Supas). The Supas 1995 contains data on more than 200,000 households that include almost 950,000 people. The Supas 1985 includes 124,000 households with almost 600,000 people. We use the Supas to measure the share of prime-age adults working in manufacturing. The Supas sample was selected to be representative for each of Indonesia's roughly 300 districts and over-samples smaller districts to increase precision.
Another supplement we use is information from a massive school construction program (Sekolah Dasar INPRES) launched by the Indonesian government in 1973 and completed in 1979. More than 61,000 primary schools were built during this period and the program targeted children who had not previously been enrolled by making the new school allocation in each district proportional to number of children of primary school age not enrolled in 1972. A detailed description of the program can be found in Duflo (2001) .
Finally, we use the 1996 Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey (MHSS) (Rahman et al. 1999) to measure intergenerational correlations of education in Bangladesh. The MHSS has information on individuals in approximately 4539 rural households clustered in 2687 baris (residential compounds) in the Matlab study area of the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research in Bangladesh (ICDDR,B). Matlab is an isolated deltaic plane some 40 miles from the capital, Dhaka, but is one of the most densely populated agrarian areas in the world, with over 2000 people per square mile (Menken and Phillips 1990) . So, while the MHSS does not attempt to be representative of the entire country, it does randomly sample a typical rural-agricultural region: in Matlab, approximately 60 percent of the MHSS population has worked most of their lives in agriculture, while in Bangladesh as a whole, between 60 and 70 percent of the total labor force is employed in agriculture and about 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas. The MHSS randomly selected approximately one-third of the baris in the ICDDR,B's surveillance area.
The MHSS questionnaires for households and individuals were developed from the IFLS questionnaires (Rahman et al. 1999) . In particular, units on education were nearly identical in the two surveys, though exceptions reflecting educational idiosyncrasies in Bangladesh are made.
7 Because the MHSS interviews took place during 1996, the youngest cohort that had (mostly) completed its education by the time of the MHSS was 17 to 21 years old in 1996 and therefore 18 to 22 years old in 1997. To make comparisons as straightforward as possible, the other cohorts in Bangladesh are defined exactly as the Indonesian cohorts: the middle cohort was 28 to 36 years old in 1997 and the older cohort was 41 to 54 years old in 1997.
Methods
Social scientists study the intergenerational transmission of advantage using a number of characteristics such as income and education and using a number of specifications. As is standard in this literature, we examine a first-order Markov model in which our variable of interest for a child c in cohort t , Y c , t , depends on the value of that indicator for his father and mother ( Y f , Y m ) along with a stochastic term, u ct , that is independent of parental characteristics and that is independently distributed across individuals and across periods:
The coefficient of interest is β ( ≡ β 1 + β 2 ), which measures the intergenerational transmission of our outcome variable, education. Richer specifications include additional characteristics of the child (age and sex) and of the parents (age when the child was born, father's profession, and so forth).
This intergenerational correlation is not necessarily causal but is an important descriptive parameter that captures all possible influences on offspring education that are correlated with parents' education. A β near 1 would imply an extremely rigid society where an offspring's education level would typically replicate her parents' education level (unless the variance of education was rising rapidly). In contrast, an intergenerational transmission parameter equal to zero, where offspring's education is unrelated to parents' education, may be evidence of a perfectly mobile society. Table 1 contains statistics descriptive of education in both Indonesia and Bangladesh; we examine Indonesia first. The trend in education is strongly upward, particularly for women: younger cohort men (born near 1978) have gained about 40 percent, and younger cohort women 95 percent, over their older cohort (born near 1950) counterparts. Hence, the schooling gap between men and women in Indonesia is narrowing. Figure 1 presents a graphical presentation of the trend, including average completed education by sex (solid line; right axis) for each 5-year birth interval between 1927 and 1977. Unsurprisingly, the upward trend is present in every generation within our cohorts: parents of the younger cohort have gained over 100 percent on parents of the older cohort, with younger cohort mothers gaining as much as 160 percent. Male children experienced the largest gains (absolutely and as a percentage of older cohort education) between the older and middle cohorts while female children experienced equally large increases between both periods.
Results
As schooling has trended upward and the male-female schooling gap has decreased, there has been a slowdown in the rate at which children overtake 138 / D  I . L   J  R . J  their parents. Male children in the older cohort achieved more than double their fathers' education and almost triple their mothers', while female children in the same cohort surpassed their mothers by nearly 160 percent and their fathers by about 60 percent. However, on average, both men and women in the younger cohort complete about 50 percent more than their fathers and about twice their mothers.
The standard deviation of children's education has fallen by up to a year between the older and younger cohort while for parents it has risen by about the same amount (slightly more for mothers, slightly less for fathers). (5) regressions-some younger cohort fathers appear also as older cohort sons. Roughly 1140 observations are shared by the column (2) and column (6) regressions-some younger cohort mothers appear also as older cohort daughters. 140 / D I. L  J R. J
Changing Intergenerational Correlations.
where E ct , E f and E m are offspring's, father's and mother's education, respectively, and e ct is assumed to be independently distributed across parents and cohorts and captures random noise in offspring education such as measurement error. Household or family members are exposed to common influences which may cause correlation in e ct , so in Table 2 observations are clustered by 1997 household to produce robust standard errors. 8 Alternate clustering schemes are discussed below.
Compare individuals in the older cohort born largely in the 1950s with those in the younger cohort born in the late 1970s. The sum of the coefficients on mother's and father's education has fallen from around 0.7 to around 0.56 for men and from around 0.83 to around 0.59 for women.
9 Also, while the coefficient on parents' education has lost magnitude absolutely, notice that mother's education's relative importance has risen from a little less than half that of father's education for men and from a little less than 70 percent for women to almost equality for both. Unlike increases in educational levels, most of the increase in intergenerational mobility has come relatively recently, as there is little change in coefficients on mother's and father's education from the older cohort to the middle cohort (born largely in the 1960s). Figure 1 demonstrates with 5-year cohorts the recent increase in intergenerational mobility (dashed line; left axis). The coefficient on parents' education for females born near 1930 is basically indistinguishable from the same coefficient for women born around 1965, but drops quickly for those born near 1975.
10
The same coefficient has slowly been falling for men, but the largest declines have coincided with the most recent generations' schooling.
Determining conclusively which factors are behind the rising relative importance of mother's education in offspring education is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, regardless, a provocative suggestion that the advantages 8 Ideally, for most specifications including those in Table 2 , we would like to cluster observations from each different cohort by the household and community cohort members were a part of as children or when they were choosing education. However, we do not have household or community identifiers for adults when they were children, and therefore choose from the available cluster levels one that captures at least the younger cohort's household or community when they were children.
9 Some members of the younger cohort were still enrolled during the 2000 IFLS. If we exclude these people the decline in the effect of parental education is slightly, but not statistically significantly, larger. If we exclude any 1997 enrolled in order to wholly avoid children whose education decisions might have been colored by the financial and macroeconomic crisis of 1997-1998, the drop is again larger but not statistically significantly so. Likewise, median regression (least absolute deviations) including enrolled individuals produces a slightly, but not statistically significantly, larger decline. 10 In results not presented, we confirm, using 5-year bands for cohorts, that only for the most recent generations are the intergenerational correlations of education (the sum of coefficients on mother's and father's education) different statistically from older generations.
useful for children to absorb, as well as the processes by which they are absorbed, are changing. Taking as given our characterization of pre-industrial Indonesia, we can offer a coherent theory about the declining importance of fathers, but we leave confirmation and elaboration to future papers. Less attention paid to caste and other customs that circumscribe education and career possibilities should tend to dull the influence of both mother and father, as neither parent will be the "quintessential" adult to imitate any longer. As liquidity constraints are relaxed and/or the cost of education is reduced, a father's income, and therefore his education, should not bind as early, or for as many. As the education gap between sexes narrows, more mothers are able to provide the extracurricular nurturing necessary for success in school, including help with homework, proper nutrition, and hygiene, and instilling attitudes about work and play. So, parents' total influence declines, perhaps because of a larger set of opportunities. Simultaneously, mothers' relative influence rises, presumably because of her enlarged skill set coupled with the fact that in Indonesia (as in most of the world), mothers are primary caregivers during the schooling period.
If we standardize the coefficients in Table 2 by multiplying them by the standard deviation of parents' education, we find a similar change between the older and younger cohorts (results not presented). For males and females, the sum of these standardized coefficients falls by about 0.05 and 0.4 (or by about 0.3 and 0.5 for unenrolled individuals only), respectively, between the older and younger cohorts. Either an extra year of parental education or an extra standard deviation of parental education have less predictive power for children born in the younger cohort. However, for both the older and younger cohorts, an extra standard deviation of parental education produces roughly the same effects in terms of standard deviations of children's education, as the standard deviation has fallen for children and risen for parents between those cohorts. As mean education has risen, an extra parental standard deviation produces less extra education, as a percent of the mean of children's education, in the younger cohort than an extra parental standard deviation in the older cohort.
Robustness
An important concern when measuring the effects of education is measurement error in the education variables. Intuitively, if education is measured with random error, its effect will be attenuated. If measurement error is most severe in the older cohorts, the apparent decline reported in Table 2 may be understated.
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where S is a diagonal matrix with elements N(1 -r i ) . N is the number of observations and is the variance of the variable i. The term r i is the reliability of variable i, defined as one minus the noise-to-variance ratio of the variable. We calculate measurement error and reliability by analyzing the multiple reports on education found in the IFLS; details are in the appendix.
In Indonesia, as in much of the rest of the world, well-educated people tend to marry each other.
11 Due to the resulting colinearity, we could not run the measurement error model with separate corrections for maternal and paternal education. Instead, we predict a child's education with the sum of mother's and father's education. These results are shown in Table 3 , along with the each cohort's calculated reliabilities (shown at the bottom of each column). Again, the effect of parents' education is declining over cohorts, and the decline is larger (both absolutely and as a percentage of the older cohort coefficients) when correcting for measurement error (Table 3 ) than when not making that correction (Table 2).   12   Table 4 adds to the baseline specification a number of control variables in order to capture other salient aspects of family background: mother's and father's height-for-age, father's profession (seven dummy variables), and parents' ages at child's birth. Due to missing data, there are no longer enough observations for comparisons with the older cohort; in addition, we were forced to drop our indicator of early parental death due to lack of variation. There remains a large decrease for women in the magnitude of the coefficients on parents' education when moving from the middle to the younger cohort. For men, the coefficients are virtually equal in both cohorts.
13
Comparing the effect of parents' education with and without controls for father's profession (Tables 2 and 4) , we find it reasonable to conclude that father's profession matters little for the educational achievement of female offspring but is important for male offspring. Indeed, some of the effect of 11 Interestingly, assortative mating on education has not changed much in Indonesia, with correlation (father's education, mother's education) near 0.7 for all three cohorts. 12 In results not presented, we use as our younger cohort sample only nonenrolled children and find the coefficient on the sum of parents' education to be virtually identical to that in Table 3. 13 Data on profession is relatively scarce in the IFLS: running the Table 4 regressions on 5-year (10-year) cohorts, we find enough observations for only the three (two) youngest cohorts (results not presented). However, with these cohorts, we do observe a drop between the youngest and oldest for men in the coefficients on parents' education, and we find again that father's profession mattered only for men, regardless of cohort. We also still observe a larger decline for women. (1) male (2) female (3) male (4) female (5) Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. N: (a) The errors-in-variables specification uses reliability estimates on parental education (derivation in the text Appendix) to modify the estimation and correct for measurement error on parental education, as described in the text. (b) Independent variable is the sum of mother's education and father's education. (c) For all cohorts: own and mother's/father's education comes from a combination of self reports, roster reports, and recall from children about their non-coresident parents. (d) Roughly 880 observations are shared by the column (1) and column (5) regressions-some younger cohort fathers appear also as older cohort sons. Roughly 1140 observations are shared by the column (2) and column (6) regressions-some younger cohort mothers appear also as older cohort daughters. parents' education on male offspring education that we measured in Table 2 can actually be attributed to father's profession. The larger difference (between coefficients on parents' education with and without controls) for the middle cohort again suggests stronger inheritance of advantage for older cohorts.
14 Here we also find rough confirmation of our theory regarding the relative importance of mothers in determining offspring education. Fathers' profession was associated with education levels (even after controlling for fathers' education) for older generations of boys, who could reasonably expect to later work in the same professions as their fathers. There would have been no such expectation among older generations of women. For more recent generations of men, the influence of father's profession is waning, as the father's profession is no longer a good predictor of male offspring profession. Further confirmation is provided by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) , who find evidence of a slightly different pattern in educational choice in India. There, as employment opportunities widen and returns to education increase, it is primarily women (who historically had low labor market participation rates) who are recently bypassing caste and heritage constraints. Unlike in Indonesia, however, those constraints continue to bind on their male siblings' educational and occupational choices.
In analyses not presented, we repeated all of the regressions with a slightly different cohort structure (i.e., choosing a younger, middle, and older cohort with different cutoff ages), and by separating the entire IFLS population aged 20 to 70 (in 1997) into 5-and 10-year cohorts (giving us ten and five cohorts, respectively). A summary of the results obtained by using the 5-year cohorts is presented in Figure 1 , which presents the evolution of the intergenerational correlation of education (defined as the sum of coefficients on mother's and father's education in equation (2)) from the oldest cohort to the youngest on the left axis and the evolution of mean education for the same cohorts on the right axis. In addition, we repeated the analyses excluding enrolled individuals from our younger cohort and by imputing enrollees' completed education. We tried alternate clustering of observations at the 1993 and 2000 household level, a multi-level household and community cluster, and at the age-12 district level in order to produce standard errors robust to different sources of error correlation. Each of these sensitivity tests produced very similar results in all regressions and did not change any of the qualitative 14 While we expect parents' education to be a good predictor of offspring education (because at least some portion of success in educational achievement is due to biologically distributed traits), we have no a priori expectations about the usefulness of parents' profession (conditional on parents' education) as a predictor of offspring education. Given what we know of social structure in Indonesia, however, it makes sense that profession could have an effect even when controlling for education. Because roles were rigidly defined, social position, rather than ability, was important for determining achievement.
conclusions. Finally, we used as regressors dummy variables representing the achievement of different levels of parental education. Though we found nonlinearities in the correlation of education (higher levels of parental education cause a greater marginal increase in children's education than lower levels), there was no substantial change across cohorts in the ratio of the coefficient on the highest level to the coefficient on the lowest level of parental education.
In short, the intergenerational transmission of education weakened in Indonesia during 1960-1997 while annual real GDP growth during those years averaged over 6 percent, 15 which is a full 4 percent higher than the previous 40-years' average. Indonesia's experience is similar to that of pre1970s United States, with rising mobility (proxied by intergenerational correlations of earnings in most U.S. studies) coinciding with the spread of industrialization (Mazumder and Levine 2001; Solon 2002) . However, even our younger cohort expect higher intergenerational correlations of education than analogous correlations (either educational or earnings) in developed countries (Couch and Dunn 1997; Dearden, Machin, and Deed 1997; Mulligan 1999; Solon 2002 ). Among developing countries for which there are published empirical studies, Indonesia's intergenerational correlations are approximately average (Behrman, Gaviria, and Szekely 2001; Binder and Woodruff 2002; Heckman and Hotz 1986; Lillard and Willis 1994) .
16 There are few developing-country longitudinal studies covering as great a span as the IFLS; Binder and Woodruff (2002) use the "1994 Gender, Age, Family and Work Household Survey" in Mexico to follow intergenerational correlations of education since the mid-1920s. They too find a modest decline through most of their study period; however, they document a reverse in the downward trend between the two youngest cohorts, suggesting to them that intergenerational mobility "stalled" in Mexico in the 1980s.
In What Cases did the Intergenerational Correlation Decline? Our main result so far is that the intergenerational correlation of education declined in Indonesia between the cohort born in the 1950s and those born at the end of the 1970s. The theories reviewed above posited that industrialization, school construction, or declining poverty might account for such a decline. In this section we examine whether the decline was concentrated in regions with those factors. As a further robustness check we then examine changes in the intergenerational correlation of consumption.
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The Role of Industrialization. Indonesia's growth has been accompanied by increasing industrialization. Several of the theories cited above posit that the shift to industrialization will trigger a rise in educational mobility. From the IFLS and the Supas, we have constructed two regional indices of manufacturing. The simplest measure, a count of the number of factories in a particular district, comes from the IFLS. Our second measure, from the 1985 and 1995 Supas, is the percent of potential workers in manufacturing, defined as the number of manufacturing workers divided by the population of those age 18 to 60 years in a district. Below, we examine whether increasing intergenerational mobility in education has been shared more or less equally by Indonesian provinces, or instead has been concentrated in those areas where most industrialization has occurred.
Consistent patterns of intergenerational mobility between heavily and lightly industrialized districts in Indonesia are difficult to distinguish. In Table 5 , we examine mobility in the presence of factories in 1993 first for the younger cohort (who were turning 13-17 in 1993) and find very little evidence that mobility is higher in districts with more factories (columns 1 through 4). Here, observations are clustered by 1993 district (for the younger cohort) or age-12 district (for the middle cohort) to produce standard errors robust to the common influences present in heavily or lightly industrialized areas.
17
Though intergenerational correlations are lower in districts with a higher factory count, the difference is slight and never statistically significant. When we use the percentage of district workers in manufacturing in 1995 as an alternate measure of industrialization (columns 5 through 8), we see that younger cohort men might be slightly more mobile in less industrialized communities, while there is no significant difference in regions for women.
We can also measure what effect industrialization had on the intergenerational transmission of education for the middle cohort 18 by using manufacturing presence in 1985 (columns 9 through 12). The evidence is similar to that for the younger cohort: Factory presence did not affect the intergenerational transmission of education.
19
To check the robustness of these findings, we ran the regressions for each cohort and each measure of industrialization using progressively more exclusive boundaries for lightly and heavily industrialized districts (results not presented). For example, we selected districts with percent manufacturing (2) women (3) men (4) women (5) men (6) women (7) men (8) women (9) men (10) women (11) Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. N: (a) "%mfg" is the number of manufacturing workers/district population aged 18-60. (b) For the younger cohort, sample is restricted to persons whose 1997 IFLS community of residence was the same as his/her 1993 IFLS community of residence. "1993 community factories" corresponds to the number of factories present in 1993 in a person's 1993 community of residence. "1995 %mfg" corresponds to the %mfg present in 1995 in a person's 1997 district of residence. (c) For the middle cohort, individuals were assumed to face 1985 levels of %mfg in the communities they lived in at age 12, even though this cohort was turning 12 from 1970-1980. That is, "1985 %mfg" corresponds to the %mfg present in 1985 in a person's age-12 district of residence. Eight hundred ninety-three men (37%) and 1158 women (42%) from the full IFLS sample never moved villages after age 12. (d) Observations are clustered by district to produce robust standard errors. (e) For both cohorts: own and mother's/father's education comes from a combination of self-reports, roster reports, and recall from children about their non-coresident parents. at or below the 40th (25th) percentile and compared them to districts with percent manufacturing at or above the 60th (75th) percentile. The coefficient patterns we describe above were essentially unchanged in all of these analyses.
In short, living in more industrialized regions does not imply detectable increases in educational mobility in Indonesia, at least at the level of our admittedly coarse measures of industrialization. It appears, rather, that any recent gains in enrollment or completion made in Indonesia are relatively equally distributed throughout more and less industrialized regions. That is not to say that more industrialized regions present the same setting as less industrialized regions regarding potential educational achievement. In the younger cohort, for example, the relative importance of mother's education in predicting offspring education rises in regions with more manufacturing. In addition, while never statistically significant, the decline in the intergenerational correlation in more industrialized regions is usually larger for women than it is for men. As these are repetitions across regions (from less to more industrialized) of our cross-cohort (from older to younger) findings, analogous conclusions apply: an industrializing community produces, for its inhabitants, noteworthy changes in the transmission and absorption of advantage. 20 While only suggestive, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the importance of occupation-specific knowledge that fathers can transmit might be shrinking relative to the importance of more general health and human capital that is usually a product of maternal education.
The Role of School Construction. School construction has also accompanied increased GDP growth in Indonesia. The Sekolah Dasar INPRES schoolbuilding program mentioned above was the fastest primary school construction program ever undertaken in the world (World Bank 1990) . Did this enormous increase in resources devoted to public education change patterns of intergenerational mobility in those districts that received the bulk of the outlays? 21 Table 6 presents regressions similar to the baseline specification in Table 2 but which control for the INPRES primary school-building program. Instead of the original three cohorts, we select a treatment cohort just young 20 An industrializing nation, meanwhile, produces changes in the same process across all of its communities. We are not claiming that the regional changes are necessarily similar in nature to the national changes, but only that both sets of changes can be documented by the same data. 21 In results not presented, we confirmed the following results from Duflo (2001) : In both cohorts, average educational attainment is always higher in regions that received fewer schools. In both regions, average educational attainment increased over time. Additionally, we found that women made bigger gains over time than men regardless of region. However, in our sample the increase in average educational attainment for men over time is about equal across regions; for women we find that average educational attainment increased more in regions that received fewer schools. The difference in these differences is not statistically significant for either men or women. (2) women (3) men (4) women (5) men (6) women (7) men (8) women (9) men (10) women (11) enough to be affected by the new schools and a control cohort just old enough to have finished primary school before the program started. Here, regions are divided into high-and low-program regions according to how many schools per child were constructed during the INPRES program. 22 In the cohort differences panel, we again observe that intergenerational correlations are mostly falling for newer cohorts, but without much variation across regions for men. For women, little has changed over time in regions that received relatively many INPRES schools, while the correlation fell in regions that received few schools. Regional differences reveal a similar pattern: For males, the difference in the intergenerational correlation between highand low-INPRES regions is about the same in the treatment cohort as it is in the control cohort. For women, there is virtually no difference between high-and low-program regions for the cohort not exposed to the program, but a large difference between regions for the treatment cohort. However, the difference is almost entirely due to a fall in the intergenerational correlation in low-INPRES districts, with virtually no movement in the correlation in high-INPRES districts. For either men or women, the change over time in regional differences (a difference-in-difference) is never statistically significant.
Neither lower cost of schooling nor increasing industrialization has been associated with movements in the intergenerational transmission of education. If Indonesia's labor market is geographically integrated and migration is not too costly, increasing local industrialization could be a powerful incentive for more schooling across Indonesia (rather than just locally). However, Federman and Levine (2003) find that returns to education have not changed much in Indonesia, at least between 1985 and 1995 (years during which the younger and middle cohorts would have been finishing school and looking for employment).
Since there was a cohort young enough to be exposed to the schoolbuilding program as well as increasing industrialization, some of the effect of the INPRES program may be counterbalanced by increasing industrialization, or vice versa. Assume, for example, that the school-building program primarily helped the poor send children to school, but increasing industrialization was primarily responsible for decreasing intergenerational correlations among the rich. Then, the failure to find differences across high-and low-INPRES (or across heavily and lightly industrialized) regions may be an artifact of differential settlement patterns: the rich could be living in heavily industrialized regions that received few new schools, while the poor might be living in lightly industrialized regions that received many new schools.
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The intergenerational correlation for men, for example, falls over time by roughly equal amounts in high-and low-INPRES regions. Our differencein-difference statistic may not adequately resolve this confound, since the cohort not exposed to the INPRES program began would not have experienced much community industrialization either (e.g., 88 percent of communities had no factories in 1974). We split the cohorts from Table 6 into four different samples based on extent of school building and extent of industrialization (results not presented) and found that industrialization is not masking a school-building effect for either men or women.
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The Role of Declining Poverty. Perhaps, then, education is a normal good which the poorer populations in Indonesia have previously been unable to afford. If it was primarily the poor and uneducated who were constrained in investments in their children's education, then some relaxation of these constraints could be enough to lower the average intergenerational transmission of education for the entire population. In Table 7 , we present evidence that suggests it is the more affluent families in Indonesia that have produced the largest decline in the intergenerational transmission of education.
We first divided the population up into families with high versus low predicted consumption. 25 Repeating our baseline analysis for this sample division, we see that while the intergenerational transmission of education is nearly the same for low-predicted-consumption families in the older and younger cohorts, it has fallen by about 0.25 between the older and younger cohorts for high-predicted-consumption families. 23 Industrialization as measured by our proxies was higher on average in low-INPRES districts: In roughly two-thirds of low-INPRES districts we observed 1995 percent manufacturing above the median, while in roughly two-thirds of high-INPRES districts, we observed 1995 percent manufacturing below the median. 24 We had no reason to expect that industrialization was counterbalancing a school-building effect for women, since the intergenerational correlation is roughly constant across time in high-INPRES regions. Evidence from the split sample described in the text confirms this expectation (results not presented): For women, the intergenerational correlation did not fall over time in high-INPRES regions, regardless of the amount of manufacturing. However, there is an indication that the intergenerational correlation fell furthest over time for women in low-INPRES regions with high levels of manufacturing. Roughly 90 percent of these regions are in Java, where the caste system was most prevalent. This again suggests that Indonesian women respond to different signals when choosing education than do Indonesian men. 25 Actual consumption was only recorded for households identified in the 1993 IFLS sampling frame. To recreate the household consumption that a middle or older cohort child would have faced during childhood, we regressed the log of household per-capita consumption on "father's profession" and a variable indicating if a parent had died before the child turned 10 years old on the sample of biological children aged 1 to 25 still living at home. We used the coefficients from this regression to create fitted values of (childhood) log household per-capita consumption for all three cohorts. (1) men (2) women (3) men (4) women (5) men (6) women (7) men (8) women (9) men (10) women (11) men (12) Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. N: (a) "lconshat" is the log of "implied consumption," where "implied consumption" is created from the fitted values of a regression (with observations clustered by 1997 household) of the log of household consumption on father's profession and an indicator of whether a parent died before the child turned 10. Others who have examined intergenerational correlations separately among those with high and low levels of advantage (Corak and Heisz 1999; Andrade et al. 2003) have emphasized that liquidity constraints are particularly likely to appear among those with fewer assets and other advantages. While we do not have direct measures of liquidity constraints, our results do not support the hypothesis that relaxing liquidity constraints among the poor is responsible for the declining intergenerational correlation we observe.
The Intergenerational Correlation of Consumption. Table 9 presents evidence that increasing mobility in education may not translate immediately into increasing mobility in well being (as measured by consumption) in Indonesia. Here, we regress household per-capita consumption on parents' education and additional controls with observations clustered at the household level. Few IFLS respondents established their own households before age 24, so the cohorts are structured to take advantage of the correspondence between survey waves and an individual's life cycle 26 as well as to match the cohorts from the education regressions whenever possible. Summary statistics on consumption for these cohorts are described in the Table 8 .
To discuss the influence of parental education on consumption, we must distinguish between cohort effects (or the variable impact of parental education across similarly aged cohorts at different points in time) and lifecycle effects (or the variable impact of parental education within one cohort as that cohort progresses through its life cycle). Take our two young cohorts (age 24 to 32 in 1993 and age 24 to 32 in 2000): the influence of parental education on young cohorts' consumption is more or less equal in 1993 and 2000. Now, follow our young 1993 cohort as it becomes 31-to 39-year-olds in 2000: within this cohort, the influence of parental education wanes as the cohort ages. That is, for those aged 24 to 32, having each parent's education rise 1 year predicts 17 percent higher consumption in 1993, falling to 16 percent in 2000 (difference not statistically significant). For those aged 31 to 39 in percent and is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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When we compare the influence of parents' education on a young cohort and an old cohort in a given year, any difference will be made up of both a cohort effect and a life-cycle effect. 28 Parents' education appears to influence the young slightly more (relative to the old cohort) in both 1993 and 2000, though the 2000 difference is statistically significant and larger than the difference in 1993. This difference-in-difference seems to indicate that parental education has recently become more important in explaining offspring consumption. 29 27 It is unclear how to describe the coefficient changes from 1993 to 2000 because consumption inequality within each cohort declined markedly during this period. The standard deviation of log consumption falls from roughly 1.2 in 1993 to near 0.7 in 2000. Thus, parental education actually rose in importance if measured as a standardized coefficient or in terms of percentile gain from having well-educated or prosperous parents.
28 To see this, note that an old cohort's consumption is determined in part by the way the labor market operated when it was younger-a cohort effect. An old cohort's consumption is also determined in part by the fact that they are older and have more experience-a life-cycle effect. 29 All results are similar if the sample in each cohort is restricted to household heads. Middle cohort- Table 2 24−32 in 1993
Older cohort- Table 2 37−50 in 1993 
24−32 in 2000
Middle cohort- Table 2 31−39 in 2000 37−50 in 2000
Middle cohort- Table 2 24−32 in 1993
Older cohort- Table 2 37−50 in 1993 158 / D I. L  J R. J Examining the old cohorts (age 37 to 50) in different time periods leads to more anticipated conclusions: For the old cohort in 2000, parental education matters less in explaining consumption than for the old cohort in 1993. This indicates that parental education has recently become less important in explaining offspring consumption. It is plausible, then, that any recent decline in the power of parental education to predict offspring consumption for recent young cohorts may not become evident for a number of years. For the young cohort (age 24 to 32), we see a decline in the effect of parents' education on consumption between 1993 and 2000 that is not perceptible statistically. Given the difference between 1993 and 2000 in the old cohort, however, we might expect the imperceptible difference to grow larger as the young cohorts age. 30 So, though we see little empirical support for the hypothesis that increasing mobility in education has been accompanied by increasing mobility in consumption, neither do we see empirical support for rejecting that hypothesis yet. Since we will not know what happens to the 2000 young cohort's consumption until much later, any conclusion must remain tentative until that time. In addition, some of the 2000 24 to 32 year olds would have been establishing households during and shortly after the financial and macroeconomic crisis of 1997-1998, which should caution against drawing conclusions until more data are available. That effects from the life cycle must be unraveled from cohort effects further complicates any deductions.
Contrasting Results from Bangladesh. Because we are unable to associate falling intergenerational correlations of education with either increasing industrialization or decreasing cost of schooling, we are tempted to say that it is development more generally, or the rising incomes that accompany general economic development, that is responsible for this movement. Indeed, if education is a normal good, Becker and Tomes (1979) observe that rising incomes will increase the demand for education.
As a suggestive test of this hypothesis we examine the intergenerational correlations of education in rural Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Indonesia are both South Asian nations with significant Muslim populations influenced by Islamic cultural norms and notions about family responsibilities. Furthermore, the structure of economic activity in these two countries was quite similar at the beginning of our study period. They were both primarily agricultural economies in 1960, having over half of value added in GDP coming from that sector. 31 Labor has been slow to exit the agricultural sector in both countries as well: 47 percent of men were employed in agriculture as late as 1997 in Indonesia, while Bangladesh still had around 50 percent of men employed there in 2000. However, while both nations had low numbers employed in and little value-added produced by manufacturing from 1960 through 1980, by 2000 Indonesia had 25 percent of value-added coming from the manufacturing sector while Bangladesh had only 15 percent (only 2 percent more than value-added by that sector in 1980 in either Indonesia or Bangladesh). Furthermore, while real GDP per capita increased by over 350 percent in Indonesia between 1960 and 1997, the comparable figure for Bangladesh is only 40 percent.
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With data from the MHSS (described above) we return to equation (2) to describe the intergenerational correlation of education in Bangladesh for a young, middle, and old cohort (whose structure is also described above in the Data section). The specifications we test are identical to our baseline regressions in Indonesia, with exceptions and corrections (noted in the text and tables) made for the peculiar nature of the MHSS and Bangladesh.
Summary Statistics. From Table 1 , we observe that trends in mean education in Bangladesh were similar to those in Indonesia. For instance, mean education has been steadily rising for both sexes in Bangladesh, but the gains for women have been more impressive: Where the older cohort females used to achieve about one-quarter the education of men, the younger cohort females now achieve about the same amount as their male counterparts. By contrast, the figure for Indonesian women in the older cohort was roughly three-quarters of men, also moving to near-equality by the younger cohort. Whereas the rate at which men outperform (in education, anyway) their parents has slowed between older and younger cohort in Bangladesh, for women it has actually increased from older to middle cohort and again from middle to younger cohort. Younger cohort females are outdoing older cohort females by nearly 500 percent.
However, even with such impressive recent gains in mean education, younger cohort Bangladeshis are still only achieving levels of education that older cohort Indonesians enjoyed (approximately). The same is true for parents: parents of children in the younger cohort in Bangladesh achieve mean education levels similar to older cohort parents in Indonesia.
Intergenerational Correlations. Table 10 presents results on the intergenerational correlation of education based on equation (2). Here again we cluster observations by household to produce robust standard errors. For women in rural Bangladesh, the intergenerational correlation of education has changed very little over the three cohorts, going from 0.58 for the oldest cohort to 0.64 for the youngest. For males, it looks as though there has been a significant drop for the youngest cohort, but these results might be clouded by the fact that some in the youngest cohort have not yet completed their schooling (nearly 50 percent of men and women are still enrolled at the survey date). In results not presented, we calculate the standardized coefficients, or the response of a child's education (in years) to a 1 standard deviation (rather than 1 year) increase in parent's education. From the oldest to the youngest cohort, the sum of the standardized coefficients on mother's and father's education falls from 2.4 to 2.0 for men and rises from 1.2 to 2.1 for women. We further standardize by children's education and find that this coefficient falls from 0.56 to 0.54 for males and rises from 0.53 to 0.59 for women between the oldest and the youngest cohort. In short, little has changed for women in between the older and younger cohorts, while for males parental education may be declining in importance. 33 We use two strategies to deal with young cohort members who are still enrolled at the survey date. In Table 11 , we impute completed years of education for enrollees in a particular age group by adding a fraction of years representing the probability of completion of all achievable higher grades. These fractions are calculated by examining mean rates of progression of each age group through the Bangladesh schooling system. Using this strategy, we see again that there has been no significant change for women over the three cohorts and young men still experience a drop in the intergenerational correlation.
The second strategy we use is to define a slightly different young cohort. In Table 12 , we use an alternate younger cohort composed of 21-to 25-yearolds (rather than 17-to 21-year-olds) in 1996. We use only the unenrolled portion of this cohort in the analysis and find again that little has changed 33 As in the IFLS, the MHSS questionnaires provides up to three reports on an individual's education: the respondent, the household head or spouse, or a child reporting on deceased or nonresident parents. While we take advantage of multiple reports to increase sample size, these multiple reports potentially exhibit all the same measurement error problems confronted in the IFLS and discussed in the appendix. With only one MHSS wave, however, there weren't enough overlapping observations among different reports to construct the reliabilities necessary for the error correction model used with the Indonesian data. (c) For all cohorts: own and mother's/father's education comes from a combination of self-reports, roster reports, and recall from children about their non-coresident parents.
(d) Roughly 25 percent of the alternate younger cohort was reported as "enrolled" in 1996.
(e) Sum of coefficients for father's and mother's education.
164 / D I. L  J R. J for women over the years. It appears as though young men are still experiencing a drop in the intergenerational correlation, but the coefficient for the youngest cohort is no longer significantly different (at the 5-percent level) from the oldest. We also examined every 5-and 10-year cohort of unenrolled individuals between the age of 20 and 70 in 1996. Figure 2 presents the progression of mean educational attainment (solid line; right axis) and the intergenerational correlation of education (dashed line; left axis) for the 5-year cohorts. Surprisingly, the intergenerational correlation of education has been rising in Bangladesh since the cohort born near 1935 completed its education, and the correlation is always larger for men than for women. The correlation peaked for both sexes in the cohort born around 1965. From there it began declining, perhaps more rapidly for men. However, the two most recent male cohorts have an intergenerational correlation of education indistinguishable visually from the cohort born 40 years earlier (around 1935) and indistinguishable statistically (results not presented) from the cohort born 15 years earlier (around 1960). For women, the correlation for the youngest 5-year cohort is statistically equal (results not presented) to the correlation for the cohort born around 1960. Figure 2 suggests that the large decrease in the intergenerational correlation for men in the younger cohort might be driven by imprecise coefficient estimates or sampling error. Estimates for the three most recent male cohorts include a noticeable spike, followed by a steep decline, followed by another Growth, Industrialization, and the Intergenerational Correlation / 165 turnaround and a modest rise. Furthermore, even if these short-term fluctuations are event driven, they still leave the intergenerational coefficient for young males in Bangladesh virtually equal to that for men born around 1940 or earlier.
In Indonesia, the intergenerational correlation has been flat or gently declining for most of the 20th century and has only recently come down decisively. This increase in the rate of decline coincides with an extended period of faster economic growth. Bangladesh, meanwhile, has seen steadily rising correlations over the same period. In Indonesia, mothers' relative importance has been rising, especially for men, while in Bangladesh mother's relative importance has been falling, especially for women. Furthermore, in Bangladesh, the correlation for men has been higher than for women in every cohort, while at the same time several older cohorts of women in Bangladesh experienced correlations lower than anything yet experienced in Indonesia. While a complete discussion of these intriguing facts is beyond the scope of this paper, we can offer a reasonable sketch: Until recently, opportunities for women in Bangladesh were either so scarce or so circumscribed that parents' education was not advantageous but largely irrelevant for preparing a daughter for her future. More recently, many women's opportunities have risen to include more of the professions and occupations their brothers enjoy, making the "absorption" of parental (especially father's) education and its correlates (such as earnings) increasingly valuable.
The available evidence from Bangladesh and its stark contrast with Indonesian indicators, then, gives at least tentative support to the notion that it may be a general rise in income that is responsible for the fall in the intergenerational transmission of advantage in Indonesia.
Summary and Conclusion
We present three main results. First, the intergenerational correlation of education declined in Indonesia between the cohort born from 1943 to 1956 and the cohort born from 1976 to 1980. Returns to education were not that different (as best we can measure) for these different cohorts, but intergenerational correlations of parents' education with children's consumption (measured with incomplete data) remained stable, meaning any claims about well-being can only be verified at a later date.
Second, the decline was not particularly faster in regions that industrialized more rapidly, in regions with more school building, or among families with fewer resources. These results cast doubt on some commonly claimed hypotheses for the intergenerational correlation of advantage.
Third, the decline in intergenerational correlation is less visible in Bangladesh, a nation with initial conditions not that different from those in Indonesia. Precision is low, so while the Bangladesh data cannot reject the hypothesis of no decline, neither can they reject the hypothesis of a decline equal to that found in Indonesia.
These results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that very low incomes contribute to a high persistence in advantage. While hardly conclusive, they are broadly consistent with theories of poverty traps. Conversely, the preponderance of evidence suggests that one of the many benefits of rising incomes in Indonesia has been an increase in the equality of opportunity. These results are quite possibly contingent on the economic policies followed by the Suharto regime, which mixed a sometimes murderous and often corrupt dictatorship with nationwide investments in children's health and education.
It is important to compare results from Indonesia and Bangladesh with other emerging markets such as India (where urbanization has eroded the caste system). If the findings elsewhere are consistent with what we find (that is, economic development promotes intergenerational mobility), some concerns about any increase in cross-sectional inequality may be reduced. At the same time, no pattern of change in intergenerational mobility provides an ethical or efficiency justification for the world's poorest children to continue to receive minimal investments in health care and education (Sachs 2005) .
It remains to be seen how the economic effects of the 1997-1998 financial crisis (and resulting government changes and decentralization of resources to the regions) will affect the intergenerational correlation and equality of opportunity in decades to come.
